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[So F. No. 18996.

In Bank.

Sept. 23, 1955.]

DIXIE GILMORE, an Incompetent Person, etc., Appellant,
v. DON GILMORE, Respondent.

1

[1] Divorce-Extreme Cruelty-Evidence.-On a husband's crosscomplaint for divorce alleging extreme cruelty, his admitted
indifference to accepted standards of normal sexual behn vior
and his opinion that intoxicated persons have no moral responsibility were insufficient to compel the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that the wife's continuous course ot
misconduct did not constitute extreme cruelty toward him.
[2] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Evidence.-The evidence and finding
in a divorce case that the husband was not guilty of cruelty
toward his wife, but on the whole was kind and considerate of
her and for many years was patient with her excessive drinking, buying her expensive gifts, taking her on extended trips
and purchasing expensive homes in an effort to save the marriage, refute the wife's contention that he was so depraved
as to be incapable of suffering from her conduct.
[3] Id.-Condonation-Evidence.-The wife in a divorce case
could not successfully assert that the evidence demonstrated
that her husband had condoned all of her alleged offenses
except those that occurred in the last several months that they
lived together, where condonation was not pleaded by her as
a defense, where there was no evidence of an express agreement to condone, and where, even if condonation had been
established with respect to her earlier misconduct, it would
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 25; [3] Divorce, § 62;
[4,5] Divorce, §60; [6-8] Divorce, §198; [9-11] Husband and

Wife, § 68; [12] Divolce, § 219; [13] Divorce, § 137.
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have been revoked by her subsequent miseonduct that was admittedly not condoned. (Civ. Code, §§ 118, 121.)
ld.-Recrimination.-When each of the parties has given the
other grounds for divorce, the eourt may grant a divorce to
both, and it is clothed with a broad discretion to advance
the requirements of justice in each particular case.
ld.-Recrimination.-The comparative guilt of the parties to
a divorce action may have an important bearing on whether
or not either one or both should be granted relief.
ld.-Permanent Alimony.-When a divorce is granted to both
parties, alimony may be awarded to either, since the basis
of liability for alimony is the granting of a divorce against
the person required to pay it. (Civ. Code, § 139.)
ld. - Permanent Alimony. - The comparative guilt of the
parties to a divorce action is only one factor in determining
whether alimony should be awarded; the needs of the wife and
the ability of the husband to provide for her are also important, and in any particular case adultery mayor may not
constitute greater fault than that of the other party.
ld.-Permanent Alimony.-In a divorce case it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny the wife a divorce and alimony,
though the trial court in granting the husband a divorce orally
expressed the view that the parties were in pari delicto particularly with regare' to sexual irregularities, where the husband's adultery did not occur until after the marriage had
failed and the parties separated, and where the wife was indifferent to her husband, had pursued a continuous course
of cruel conduct toward him, had disregarded accepted standards of sexual behavior and thus, before she finally left him
and instituted the divorce action, had forfeited her right to
alimony.
Husband and Wife - Oommunity and Separate PropertyProfits of Husband's Busir.ess.-Where the husband is operating a business which is his separate property, income from
such business is allocated to community or separate property
in ;lccordance with the extent to which it is allocable to the
husband's efforts or his capital investment.

[5] P.ecrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce
eases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Divorce and
Separation, § 61; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233.
[6] Allowance of permanent alimony to wife against whom
divorce is granted, note, 34 A.L.R.2d 313. See also OaJ.Jur.2d,
Divorce and Separation, § 201 et seq.; Am.Jur., Divorce alid Separation, § 586 et seq.
[9] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Community Property, i 22; Am.Jur..
munity Property. § 33.
• _ _
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[10] Id. - Community and Separate Property - Profits of Bus·
band's Business.-A proper method of making an allocation of
income from a business which is the husband's separate prop·
erty is to deduct from the total earnings of the business the
value of the husband's servi8es to it; the remainder, if any,
o.
represents the earnings attributable to the separate property
invested in the business.
[11] Id. - Community an.d Separate Property - Profits of Husband's Business.-The rule that the proper m3thod for determining what part of the increase in value of a husband's
separate business was community property is to subtract from
the total increase a reasonable return on the value at the
time of the marriage and treat the remainder as community
property may be applied only in the absence of circumstances
showing a different result, and may not be applied where the
husband can prove that a larger return on his capital had
in fact been realized.
[12] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Jurisdiction Over Property Rights.-Where the evidence in a divorce case supports
the trial court's finding that property was held in joint tenancy,
the court, in the absence of an award of alimony, has no
authority to assign the husband's separate property to the
wife by requiring him to use it to protect her property interests.
[13] Id.-Appeal-Grounds for Reversal.-A judgment denying
the wife a divorce and awarding one to the husband on his
eross-complaint will not be reversed on the ground that, approximately eight months after the termination of the trial
she was adjudicated an incompetent and her father was appointed her guardian, where she was represented by able
eounsel and was observed at the trial, which lasted approximately one month, by the court and counsel, and where she
was examined by a psychiatrist, whose testimony she offered
with respect to the effect of the husband's alleged cruelty on
her, and such testimony contained no suggestion that she was
mentally incapable of participating in the trial.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County. Jordan L. Martinelli, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for divorce, in which defendant filed a cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment for defendant on crosscomplaint, affirmed.
James Martin MacInnis and Nicholas Alaga for Appellant.
Michael L. Haun, Myers &I Meehan and .Wa.llilcQ S.
for Respondent.
- -----\I
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THAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in
1946 and lived together for approximately six years before
this action for divorce was filed-in 1952. There were no children of the marriage. "In her amended and supplemental
complaint plaintiff alleged that defendant was guilty of
extreme cruelty, desertion, and adultery. Defendant answered
and cross-complained alleging extreme cruelty. The trial
court awarded defendant an interlocutory decree of divorce
based on findings of extreme cruelty. It also found that
defendant had not been guilty of cruelty or desertion, that
there was no community property, that specified real and
personal property belonged to the parties as joint tenants, and
that the remainder of the property claimed to be community
was the separate property of defendant or a corporation
owned by him. With respect to plaintiff's allegations of
defendant's adultery, the court found that the allegations
thereof were untrue, "save and except-that it is true that
during the period between the first day of June, 1952 and the
20th day of June, 1952, the defendant herein indulged in at
least six acts of sexual intercourse with women not his wife,
in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California;
that none of said acts of sexual intercourse constituted extreme cruelty toward plaintiff; that none of said acts of sexual
intercourse caused plaintiff herein any mental pain or suffering, and each and all of said acts were committed subsequent
to the filing of the . • . action." Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff contends that defendant's own testimony establishes that her conduct could not have constituted extreme
cruelty toward him. She bases this contention on the
fact that defendant was not disturbed by alleged sexual irregularities involving himself, plaintiff, and another woman, and
on his testimony with respect to his attitude toward drinking
that "Well, when you are tight, I don't think you have any
moral responsibility." There is substantial evidence, however,
to support the finding of the trial court that "for the period
of more than four years last past next immediately preceding
the commencement of the above-entitled action, plaintiff has
wilfully and wrongfully treated defendant in a cruel and
inhuman manner, and in utter disregard and in violation of
her marital duties and obligations toward defendant, anp has
caused defendant great and grievous mental pain and suffering without cause or provocation therefor; that on numerous
occasions in the presence of defendant and other persons,
plaintiff has wrongfully called defendant vile and opprobrious
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names, causing defendant s11ame and humiliation thereby; that
for more than four years last past the plaintiff has wilfully
and without good cause failed to exhibit any love or affection
toward defendant, that during the period of the last four
years the said plaintiff has drunk intoxicating liquor to excess;
and on numerous occasions, while under the influence of
liquor, has quarreled and nagged at defendant and called him
vile names, in the presence of other persons, without justi.
fication or cause, that for more than three years last past the
plaintiff has wilfully, wrongfully and without good cause
refused the defendant reasonable, or any, matrimonial sexual
intercourse; [and] that said plaintiff has, on numerous occasions during the marriage, without cause, wrongfully and
violently struck said defendant, causing him shame, humiliation, embarrassment and grievous and great mental pain and
suffering. "
[1] We do not believe that defendant's admitted indifference to accepted standards of normal sexual behavior and
his opinion that intoxicated persons have no moral responsibility were sufficient as a matter of law to compel the trial
court to conclude that plaintiff's continuous course of misconduct did not constitute extreme cruelty toward him. Thus,
that defendant might in the privacy of his own home engage
in or observe abnormal sexual activities without moral
qualms," or consider intoxication a release from moral responsibility, does not necessarily establish that he was insensitive
to public humiliation, physical attacks, and the denial of
marital rights. [2] Moreover, the evidence and finding that
defendant was not guilty of cruelty toward plaintiff refute
plaintiff's contention that he was so depraved as to be incapable of suffering from his wife's conduct. On the whole
defendant was kind and considerate of plaintiff. Although
on two occasions he slapped her and on others called her names,
these incidents were trivial in comparison to similar conduct
of plaintiff's and were probably provoked by her. For many
years defendant was patient with plaintiff's excessive drink·The issue of abnormal sexual behavior was introduced into the case
by plaintiff's testimony that the marriage failed owing to defendant's
constant reiteration of ' , revolting sexual suggestions" to her. She denied
that she had ever engaged in any abnormal sex practices. To refute this
testimony defendant testified that plaintiff had been a willing participant
in abnormal sex acts with another woman and that he had been a
"glorified observer." Defendant's testimony was corroborated by that
of the other woman. Although the trial court made no finding with
respect to this issue, it stated in its oral opi.nion that it thought the
parties were in pari delicto with respect to it.
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ing, and he came home from bis business early in the afternoons and stayed with her almost every evening because she
did not like to be left alone. H.e bought her many expensive
gifts, took her on extended trips, and purchased two expensive
homes in an effort to save the marriage.
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that the evidence demonstrates that defendant condoned all of her alleged offenses
except those that occurred in the last several months that the
parties lived together. There is no merit in this contention.
Condonation was not pleaded by plaintiff as a defense and the
evidence was not such as to compel a finding that it had been
established. (See Hamburger v. Hamburger, 60 Cal.App.2d
530, 536-537 [141 P.2d 453].) Section 118 of the Civil Code
provides that "Where the cause of divorce consists of a course
of offensive conduct, or arises, in cases of cruelty, from excessive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggregately, constitute
the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal
kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the
acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express
There is no evidence of an exagreement to condone."
press agreement to condone, and even had condonation been
established with respect to plaintiff's earlier misconduct it
would have been revoked by her subsequent similar misconduct
that was admittedly not condoned. (Civ. Code, § 121.)
Plaintiff contends that even on the basis of the facts
found by the trial court a divorce should have been granted
to both of the parties so that alimony could be awarded tt)
her. (See Mueller v. Mueller, 44 Cal.2d 527 [282 P.2d 869].)
Since the trial court found on substantial evidence that defendant was not guilty of cruelty or desertion, it could only have
awarded plaintiff a divorce on the ground of defendant '8
adultery committed after the action was commenced and
pleaded for the first time in plaintiff's supplemental complaint.
Defendant contends that adultery committed after the filing
of the action is not a ground for divorce, and that, in any
event, relief could not be predicated on a supplemental complaint once it had been determined that plaintiff had no cause
of action under the allegations of her original complaint. (See
Imperial Land 00. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 173 Cal. 668, 673
[161 P. 116, 119].) Plaintiff contends, on the other hand,
that defendant's adultery may properly be relied upo"n by
her regardless of when it occurred or how it was pleaded
and that the trial court erroneously accepted defendant 'a
view that his adultery could not be considered.
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Since we have concluded that the trial court fully considered and disposed of the issue of defendant's adultery and
did not abuse its dbcretion by denying plaintiff a divorce, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the judgment could also be
sustained on the grounds urged by defendant above.
"The supplemental complaint was permitted to be filed
over defendant's objection, his motion to strike the evidence
supporting its allegations was denied, and the trial court
expressly found that the allegations of some 10 to 14 acts of
adultery were untrue except that "it is true that ••• defendant herein indulged in at least six acts of sexual intercourse
with women not his wife" while he was married to defendant.
It thus appears that the trial court considered the allegations
and evidence of adultery and made a finding that defendant
was guilty thereof.
[4] The applicable rule in this situation was recently
restated in Mueller v. Mueller, 44 Ca1.2d 527, 530 [282 P.2d
869] . "When each of the parties has given the other grounds
for divorce, the court may grant a divorce to both, and it 'is
clothed with a broad discretion to advance the requirements
of justice in each particular case.' (5, 6] The comparative
guilt of the parties 'may have an important bearing upon
whether or not either one or both should be granted relief,'
and when 'a divorce is granted to both, alimony may be
awarded to either, for the basis of liability foJ;' alimony is the
granting of a divorce against the person required to pay it.
(See Civ. Code, § 139.)' (De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 39
Ca1.2d 858, 872-874.••• )" [7] It was also pointed out
that the comparative guilt of the parties "is only one factor
in determining whether alimony should be awarded and that
the needs of the life and the ability of the husband to provide
for her are also important," and that in "any particular
case adultery mayor may not constitute greater fault than
that of the other party." (44 Cal.2d at 530, 532.) In that
case the court affirmed an award of alimony to a wife found
guilty of adultery on the ground that no abuse of discretion
was shown.
[8] In the present case, on the other hand, the trial court
concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a divorce or alimony. In doing so it was necessary for it to weigh the
conflicting charges of sexual abnormality, none of which were
established as grounds for relief, plaintiff's continuous course
of cruel conduct toward defendant, defendant's lack of cruelty
toward plaintiff, defendant's adultery, plaintiff's need for
8uppo~t, and defendant 'a ability to provide it. Although
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in its oral opinion the trial court expressed tIle view
that the parties were in pm'i delicto, particularly with regard
to sexual irregularities, the fipdings, which are controlling,
and the judgment based thereon reflect thc ultimate determination that plaintiff's cruelty justified the denial of relief
to her. Although this determination may seem harsh, it
should be noted that had defendant not committed adultery
after the marriage had failed and the parties separated, on
the basis of its findings, the trial court could have reached
no other conclusion. In other words, before plaintiff finally
left defendant and instituted this action she had forfeited her
right to alimony. In the light of plaintiff's indifference
to her husband, her continuous course of cruel conduct
toward him, and the evidence of her own disregard of accepted
standards of sexual behavior, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying her relief or hold as a
matter of law that defendant's adultery occurring after the
failure of the marriage compelled the reinstatement of plaintiff's right to alimony.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in :finding that
there was no community property. She bases this contention
on the fact that during the marriage defendant's net worth
representing his interests in three incorporated automobile
dealerships increased from $182,010.46 to $786,045.52. During
this period defendant received salaries from his dealerships
ranging from a total of $22,250 in 1946 to a total of $66,799.92
in 1952. The trial court found that the salaries paid defendant by the corporations for his services "rendered to and on
behalf of said corporations during the married life of the
parties hereto, were and are sufficient to fully compensate
said defendant and the community for all of the services
rendered to and on behalf of said corporations by defendant
during said period of marriage, all of which said salaries
have been used and expended for community purposes during
said marriage." [9] In Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784,
792 [167 P .2d 708], the court stated that "In regard to earnings, the rule is that where the husband is operating a business
which is his separate property, income from such business is
allocated to community or separate property in accordance
with the extent to which it is aUocalf..e to the husband 's ~fforts
or his capital investment." [10] It has frequently been
held that a proper method of making such allocation is to
deduct from the total earnings of the businE'ss the value of
the husband's services "to it. The remainder, if &ll1", represents
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the earnings attributable to the separate property invested in
the business. (llarrold v. Harrold, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 79-81 [271
P.2d 489]; Huber v. Huber, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 792;
Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal.App.2d 587, 599-601 [250 P.2d
730] ; Cozzi v. Oozzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232-233 [183 P.2d
739'] ; Seligman v. Seligman, 85 Cal.App. 683, 687 [259 P.
984] .) This method was followed by the trial court in
this case, and the evidence sustains its findings. Defendant's
corporations were staffed by well trained personnel who were
capable of carrying on the businesses unassisted. Defendant
worked relatively short hours and took many extended vacations. There was expert testimony that the salaries he reeeived, which were found to constitute community income,
were more than ample compensation for the services he
rendered. Moreover, during the period involved there was a
tremendous increase in automobile business that was accompanied by an increase in the value of dealer franchises.
[11] Plaintiff contends, however, that the proper method
for determining what part of the increase in value of the
businesses was community property is to subtract from the
total increase a reasonable return on the value at the time
of the marriage and treat the remainder as community property. She relies on Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7 [103 P.
488, 134 Am.St.Hep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880], in which the
court stated: "In the absence of circumstances showing a
different result, it is to be presumed that some of the profits
were justly due to the capital invested. There is nothing to
show that all of it was due to defendant's efforts alone. The
probable contribution of the capital to the income should have
been determined from the circumstances of the case, and as
the business was profitable it would amount at least to the
usual interest on a long investment well secured." If this
method were followed in the present case it would be necessary to allocate to the community a large part of the increase
in defendant's net worth during the marriage. The rule
of the Pereira case is not, however, in conflict with the rule
of the cases cited above and followed by th.e trial court in
this case. It is to be applied only" In the absence of circumstances showing a different result," and the court clearly
recognized that if the husband could prove that a larger return
on his capital had in faet been realized the allocation should
be made differently. (156 Cal. at 11-12.) In the present
case defendant introduced substantial evidence that the
salaries he received were a proper measure of the community
interes,t in the earnings of the businesses, and the trial court'i
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finding based thereon cannot be disturbed on appeal. (HmTold
v. Harrold, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 80-81; Gudclj v. Gudclj, 41
Cal.2d 202, 211 [259 P.2d 656].}
[12] Plaintiff contends that the court deprived her of
any real interest in the property found to be held in joint
tenancy by failing to require defendant to protect the property against foreclosure and sale for nonpayment of the
encumbrances thereon. She contends that such protection
could have been afforded had it been found that the property
was community, and that in any event, some provision should
have been made to protect her interest. The evidence, however, supports the trial court's finding that the property was
held in joint tenancy, and in the absence of an award of
alimony the trial court had no authority to assign defendant's
separate property to plaintiff by requiring him to use it to
protect plaintiff's property interests. (Fox v. Fox, 18 Cal.2d
645, 646 [117 P.2d 325]; see Huber v. Huber, supra, 27
Ca1.2d 784, 793, and cases cited; Citizens Nat. Trust &- Sav.
Bank v. Hawkins, 87 Cal.App.2d 535, 542 [197 P.2d 385].)
[13] Approximately eight months after the termination of
the trial plaintiff was adjudicated an incompetent, and her
father was appointed her guardian. She now contends that
her "now-recogni7ed lack of mental competency pervaded
her entire participation in the trial," and that therefore the
judgment should be reversed. Plaintiff was represented by
able counsel and was observed at the trial, which lasted
approximately one month, by the court and counsel. Moreover, she was examined by a psychiatrist whose testimony she
offered with respect to the effect of defendant's alleged cruelty
on her, and his testimony contains no suggestion that she was
mentally incapable of participating in the trial. In the light
of the foregoing considerations it is clear that the record fails
to establish that her present incompetency existed at the time
of the trial and prevented her from fairly presenting her case.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in admitting and excluding evidence. We
have considered her contentions with respect to the questioned
rulings and have concluded that even if they were erroneoUB
no prejudicial error has been shown.
The judgment is affirmed..
-.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schaner, J., eon(!Urroo.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J .. concw.'l'ed in the
judgment.
_ . __ '
. _-.

